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Reason and Imagination in Charles
S. Peirce
Sara Barrena
1 Charles S.  Peirce was always interested in investigating how reason functions and in
explaining how new ideas arise. As a result of his research in this area, linked to the
development of pragmatism – which emphasizes the clarification of concepts by means of
their  “reasonable”  consequences  –  he  arrived  at  a  conception  of  reason  as  being
profoundly creative, and which directs other capacities and interacts with them. Peirce
writes: “what he adores, if he is a good pragmaticist, is power; not the sham power of
brute force, which, even in its own specialty of spoiling things, secures such slight results;
but the creative power of reasonableness, which subdues all other powers, and rules over
them with its sceptre, knowledge, and its globe, love” (CP 5.520, c.1905).
2 In this article I aim to explore Peircean creativity more deeply, focusing on one of its
essential, thought perhaps less studied, elements: the imagination. This faculty should be
taken  more  into  account,  given  that  Peirce  affirms  that  the  whole  business  of
ratiocination, and all that makes us intellectual beings, is performed in imagination (CP
6.286,  1893).  Hence it  is  necessary to study a connection – that  between reason and
imagination  –  in  which  the  most  important  aspects  of  the  Peircean  conception  of
reasonableness are rooted. As Andacht has written: “it is not exaggerated to talk about a
‘revolution’... when one evaluates historically the theoretical integration of imagination
and rationality, of esthetics and action, such as it was done by Peirce...” (Andacht 1996:
1266). What does Peirce understand by imagination? How is its connection with reason
produced? In addition to the obvious role of imagination in the process of abduction, i.e.
in the origin of possible explanatory hypotheses, pragmatist imagination also performs
other functions. It is fundamental in mathematical thought, in philosophical reasoning,
and  in  all  aspects  of  knowledge,  since  for  Peirce  understanding  the  world  means
interpreting it, and we cannot interpret without imagination.
3 This article, written based on Peirce’s illuminating texts about imagination, is divided
into  five  parts.  In  the  first  part,  I  will  explain  the  necessity  of  the  imagination  for
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understanding the world. Next, I will focus on the principal characteristics that Peirce
attributes  to  the  imagination,  followed  by  an  analysis  of  the  role  that  this  faculty
develops  within  Peircean  pragmatism.  The  fourth  part  will  illustrate,  by  means  of
examples, how Peirce deals with imagination in different areas of his thought. Finally, I
will consider the conjunction of reason and imagination itself, in order to disentangle the
different mechanisms by which this conjunction comes into play: habits, surprise, doubt,
belief and expectations.
 
I. The Necessity of Interpretation
4 Usually Peirce is classified as a realist philosopher, or at least one who was on a trajectory
towards realism. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Peirce’s realism is sui generis.
For him, things are there, outside of ourselves. What is real is precisely that which our
thought cannot modify, and hence is what it is independently of what we may think or
imagine about it. Nevertheless, for Peirce it was insufficient merely to explain a reality
which is,  in  some manner,  transparent:  rather,  one  must  interpret  it.  His  notion of
semiotics, in which everything is a sign and knowledge is mediated by signs – or more
correctly, is itself constituted as a sign – involves the necessity of interpreting the world.
Reality is that which is independent of what we think, but which nevertheless generates
interpretants that reveal it, in the infinite process of signification. As Mariluz Restrepo
points out:
Peirce  uses  splendid  metaphors  in  order  to  express  what  we  do  with  the
phenomenon under study: ‘absorb it,’ ‘sleep over it,’ ‘assimilate it,’ ‘dream of it,’ ‘set
it down upon paper,’ ‘digest it,’ ‘give it an order,’ ‘deliver it in a form,’ (MS 857, 4-5,
n. d.), that is, interiorize it in such a way that we penetrate it while at the same time
we are penetrated by it. We also register it, ponder it and organize it, seeking to
discover that which explains it and thereby be able to comprehend it. (Restrepo
2011)
5 Our manner of knowing is precisely that of performing a re-creative reading of reality,
which we could not accomplish without the imagination. Observation alone cannot be
constitutive  of  investigation  or  knowledge.  There  must  be  a  meticulous  process  of
thought, by means of which the ideas given by observation produce others in the mind (W
3.41-42). This investigation, by means of which we attain a grasping of the world, is not,
for Peirce, “a merely rational process,  but rather is ‘reasonable,’  and includes senses,
imagination and memory; desires, projects and hopes; ideas, concepts and arguments”
(Restrepo 2011).
6 Imagination  is  required  at  the  moment  of  grasping  the  world  because,  for  Peirce,
knowledge is interpretation; it involves combining observation with reflection until the
mind finally renders up to us the facts in a given fashion which explains them. This
interpretation must be, as I will show, both imaginative as well as rigorous. Reason and
imagination go hand in hand.
7 This equilibrium between a reality that is what it is while simultaneously being open to
interpretation, between the application of reason and the imagining of an explanation, is
present throughout the entirety of Peirce’s thought. We cannot know without imagining.
This intimate union of reason and imagination, which is perhaps most evident in science
or  art,  occurs  in  each  of  our  reflections  –  or  interpretations  –  concerning  reality,
whatever their order may be, and makes pragmatism a creative philosophy.
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II. Peirce’s Concept of the Imagination
8 Peirce  can  be  considered  as  one  of  the  most  imaginative  thinkers  in  history.  His
intellectual trajectory is marked by many discoveries in different fields which he would
not have achieved without a powerful imagination: from the fruitful pragmatic maxim to
his omnipresent triadic system of categories. Peirce embodies creative thought, which
oscillates between reason and imagination. He has much to say about the latter and about
the plasticity which it confers on the human being.
9 Peirce  deals  with  the  question  of  imagination  more  than  we  sometimes  think.  For
instance, the references to imagination in Collected Papers are abundant,  and many of
these texts shed light upon the role of the most creative faculty of the human being.
Imagination appears in these texts as something distinct from mere fantasizing. Peirce
makes  a  distinction  between  imagination  and  fantasy,  which  Howard  Callaway  has
examined in the light of certain antecedents in Coleridge and Emerson. We can cite, for
example, a suggestive text by Emerson:
Imagination is central; fancy superficial. Fancy relates to surface, in which a great
part of life lies. The lover is rightly said to fancy the hair, eyes, complexion of the
maid. Fancy is a willful imagination, a spontaneous act; fancy, a play as with dolls
and puppets which we chose to call men and women; imagination, a perception and
affirming  of  a  real  relation  between  a  thought  and  some  material  fact.  Fancy
amuses;  imagination  expands  and  exalts  us.  Imagination  uses  an  organic
classification. Fancy joins by accidental resemblance, surprises and amuses the idle,
but  is  silent  in  the  presence  of  great  passion  and  action.  Fancy  aggregates;
imagination animates. Fancy is related to color; imagination to form. Fancy paints;
imagination sculptures. (Emerson 1875)
10 Imagination has the capacity of penetrating, expanding, animating. For Peirce it consists
in “the power of distinctly picturing to ourselves intricate configurations” (MS 252, n.d.).
Nevertheless, pragmatist imagination, as Thomas Alexander has written, is not merely
the psychological property of having images of absent or non-existent objects, nor it is
only a power for unlimited creativity beyond any rational comprehension, as was the
Romantic imagination; rather, it offers a radically different perspective:
Imagination is neither merely an extension of the passive capacity of sensation,
subsumable under pre-established rational categorial structures, nor is it a purely
intuitive source of novelty. It is a mode of action and as such seeks to organize
experience so that  it  anticipates  the world in a  manner that  is  meaningful  and
satisfying. In more human terms, it is an essential and necessary element in our
perpetual project of making sense of life. (Alexander 1990: 341)
11 Imagination, for Peirce, is not a mere producer of images nor a wide-awake dreaming, a
merely lazy mind. It is neither a fantasy nor a perception, although the (uncontrollable)
percipuum can be converted,  Peirce writes,  into a controllable imagination by a brief
process of education (CP 7.646, 1903). Imagination does not function in an uncontrolled
fashion; rather, it can be educated and helps us to grow. One must not confuse the great
potential of the imagination with mere fantasy, since for Peirce the castles that we build
in the air must be copied, with effort, on the ground: “every man who does accomplish
great things is given to building elaborate castles in the air and then painfully copying
them  on  solid  ground…  Mere  imagination  would  indeed  be  mere  trifling;  only  no
imagination is mere” (CP6.286, 1893). Imagination should stimulate and orient our action.
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12 On one occasion Peirce distinguishes various types of imagination: the scientific, which
dreams of explanations and laws, the artistic, and the mere dreaming of opportunities for
gain (CP 1.48, c.1896). Of course, imagination is a fundamental tool in art, but science also
requires as a prelude a pretty wild play of the imagination (CP 1.48), and this holds for
knowledge of any given order. It is indispensable for knowing the truth. This is so much
the case, Peirce affirms, that man’s mind has a natural adaptation to imagining correct
theories of some kinds (CP 5.591, 1903). The scientist, honest, disinterested, indeed any
kind of researcher,  is precisely that person who places his or her imagination at the
service of the truth. He looks for reasonable hypotheses or conjectures which have a
certain basis, as opposed to purely fantastic ones. Scientists seek explanations which take
into account that which has come before, accumulated knowledge, living science. They do
not seek fantastic conjectures, but reasonable ones, hypotheses which take into account
the continuity of research in order to distinguish that which is both imaginative and
useful  from merely fantasy.  There is  an imagination which is  genuinely creative and
appropriately  disciplined,  which  arises  from  the  tension  between  a  systematic  and
detailed consideration of past attainments in a field and its outstanding problems and
anomalies (Callaway 2007).
13 The imaginative world has such an important presence that, as Peirce states, it cannot be
distinguished from the actual world by any description (CP 3.363, 1885). The imagination
permits  us  to  come to  know something more than what  is  immediately  present  (CP
1.38,1890), there is in it such an operation by which thought springs up (CP 1.538, 1903),
allows that phenomena connect themselves together in a rational way (CP 1.46, c.1896),
and expands our environment while permitting us to discover unexpected solutions.
14 The imagination permits us to enjoy freedom, because for Peirce the products of the
imagination are not necessarily determined in all their aspects, as Berkeley, for instance,
sustained. The imaginary does not have existence in the sense understood by Peirce; it
does not react to anything, it suffers no resistances and hence provides us with greater
freedom. There is a free play of the imagination which is essential to art and science, and
which permits the continuity of ideas, since new ideas must have always been taken in
imagination before the old ones are allowed to drop (CP 7.429, 1893). Peirce terms this
imaginative play musement, and it is what makes abduction possible, that is, a particular
state of mind which passes freely from one thing to another. Musement is a mental state
characterized by free speculation, without rules or purpose or limits of any kind. The
mind plays with ideas and can sustain a dialogue with what it perceives, a dialogue not
only of words but also of images, in which the imagination plays an essential part.
15 Imagination has nothing to do with issues of fact or with states of things which might at
some point come about; rather it deals with non-existent states of things, and with the
manner  in  which  unoriginal  parts  unite  to  give  rise  to  something  original,  since
originality is not an attribute of the matter of life, but is an affair of form, of the way in
which parts none of which possess it are joined together (CP 4.611, 1908). Since it has
nothing to do with facts, the imagination can give rise to necessary knowledge, as occurs
in mathematics. How can it be that the freest faculty of all, the least subject to rules,
which permits us to fly and build castles in the air give rise to necessary knowledge? For
Peirce it is possible because necessary knowledge does not follow a path which cannot be
deviated from: “Much unexpected truth may often be brought to light by the repeated
reintroduction of a premise already employed” (CP 4.611). It is frequently the case that
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the necessary reasoner encounters distinct lines of reasoning which open before him or
her. It is false that in necessary reasoning little space is left for the exercise of invention.
16 In  sum,  there  is  no  other  quality  which  is  so  indispensable  for  knowledge  as  the
imagination. It does not consist in mere fantasies, but rather has an essential scientific
function, where we understand science to encompass all true knowledge and all artistic
expression.  Following  Emerson,  one  can  say  that  for  Peirce  the  imagination  is
constructive,  cognitively  oriented,  and  examines  relations,  forms  and  possibilities.
Without its creative work the inquirer would have no world to explore, no determinate
hypothetical state of affairs to investigate with the rigor of reasoning (Campos 2009: 137).
Imagination is linked with action, and with the desire to know. In what follows I will show
how pragmatism makes use of this tool.
 
III. The Role of Imagination in Pragmatism
17 “All scientific men are engaged upon nothing else than the endeavor to discover,” writes
Peirce (MS 1334),  and one can say that an emphasis on discovery is  an emphasis on
imagination.  While the role that,  for Peirce,  experience plays in knowledge has been
strongly  emphasized,  the  role  of  the  imagination  has  not  been studied  to  the  same
degree. This is despite the fact that Peirce himself affirms that there are two fundamental
kinds of reasoning: the imaginative and the experiential, that is, reasoning by means of
diagrams  or  reasoning  by  means  of  experiments  (CP  4.74,  1893).  Experience  and
imagination are two complementary wellsprings, which do not always go hand in hand.
At times, the imagination works without directly depending on experience, as in the case
of certain mathematical conceptions which do not derive from physical experience (CP
4.238, 1902). For example, conceiving the idea of imaginary quantity and imagining non-
Euclidian  measurement,  both  take  place  in  the  thoroughly  theoretical  context  of  a
hypothetical state of things, and mathematicians exercise “immense genius” in creating
them in order to solve pure mathematical problems (CP 4.238, 1902). Experience makes
possible the creative work of the mathematical imagination, but it is not a necessary
condition (Campos 2009: 138).
18 Pragmatism, which Peirce did not consider to be a philosophical doctrine, but rather the
expression of the genuine scientific method – beginning with experience and returning to
it in order to confirm hypotheses and concepts on the basis of their effects – involves a
defense of imagination, which must be put into play in order to explore the possible
consequences of the concepts and the reasonable actions to which it may give rise. The
method  of  pragmatism  prescribes  to  trace  out  in  the  imagination  the  conceivable
practical consequences of the affirmation or denial of the concept (CP 8.191, c.1904),
which in turn permits the clarification and development of the concept, such that its
meaning may transcend mere effects in the here and now, thereby attaining the realm of
the possible: “[the method] allows any flight of imagination, provided this imagination
ultimately  alights  upon a  possible  practical  effect  […]  it  makes  conception reach far
beyond  the  practical”  (CP  5.196,  1903).  In  this  way,  the  actual  is  reinterpreted  and
reconstructed in the light of what is possible, and human reason is conceived of in a way
that  is  radically  different  from  the  traditional  vision  of  rationality,  which  leaves
imagination out. The imagination is no longer seen as a spontaneous and undisciplined
faculty,  but  rather  as  something  which  actively  intervenes  in  the  clarification  and
development of our ideas, integrating with rationality and action. In this way the role of
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the non-propositional in our experience, i.e.  the aesthetic dimension of rationality, is
taken into account (Alexander 1990: 325-6).
19 In the process of investigation defended by pragmatism, the imagination is necessary at
every  step.  It  is  necessary,  of  course,  for  arriving  at  hypotheses  through abduction.
Abductive reasoning presupposes an imaginative effort of understanding, beginning with
an  “aesthetic-hypothetic”  response  to  the  world  (Alexander  1990:  329).  Abduction
involves a creative use of the imagination: the scientist asks his or her imagination about
how things  might  be,  imagines  possible  explanations and makes  suppositions  which,
according to Peirce, constitute an increase of information (CP 2.430, 1893).
20 In order that science may advance it is necessary to imagine distinct things, and Peirce
himself, as a scientist and practical thinker, practices what he preaches. His work is filled
with  imaginative  conjectures  and  suppositions  which help  him in  his  reasoning:  for
example, let us imagine, states Peirce, that that separate corpuscles related to atoms are
endowed with free will (CP 1.261, c.1902); imagine that at a certain moment velocity was
suddenly imparted to every atom and corpuscle of the universe (CP 1.274, c.1902); we may
imagine the atom of argon to be really formed of four triads (CP 4.309, c.1902), or imagine
some molecules as something like little solar systems,  only vastly more complex (CP
6.283, 1893), however, we can hardly imagine that the number of atoms in protoplasm is
much less than a thousand (CP 1.393, c.1890). In some texts, Peirce imagines that he is
seeking to explain a given doctrine to someone that doesn’t know it, or he speaks with
imaginary interlocutors. Numerous texts begin with “let us imagine” or “let us suppose.”
He uses imaginative metaphors, such as his comparison of consciousness to a bottomless
lake in which ideas are suspended at different depths, with a constant rain of perceptions
that falls upon it (CP 7.553, n.d.). In order to evaluate certain arguments, Peirce also uses
his imagination; for instance, in order to evaluate the Neglected Argument for the Reality
of God he imagi- nes how it would be considered by three types of people: the first of
small  instruction,  the  second inflated with current  notions  of  logic,  and the  third a
trained man of science (CP 6.478, 1908).
21 Within pragmatism the imagination is not only necessary for coming up with hypotheses,
but also for testing them. Indeed, in the texts of Peirce we find that the imagination
constitutes the first test for hypotheses. One must discern, prior to taking any other step,
whether something is imaginable or not. For Peirce, it is possible that we might have an
idea, while nonetheless concluding that it cannot be imagined. In turn, whatever cannot
be imagined must be rejected. Thus, if a scientist is confronted with a hypothesis of any
order, it is necessary that he or she ask “does the hypothesis hold up in the world of the
imagination?” and “does it hold up in that creative world which is not merely a fantasy,
but possesses its own proper logic?” In addition, these first imaginary experiments cost
very little, as Peirce notes.
22 Furthermore,  Peirce  considers  the  criterion  of  inconceivability  as  fundamental  for
knowing whether a proposition is necessarily true, i.e. to test whether its negation is
inconceivable. A proposition will necessarily be true if it is impossible to imagine a state
of things in which it would be false, a state not merely unrealizable in imagination today
but unrealizable after indefinite training and education (CP 2.29, c.1902).
23 The imagination, nonetheless, not only intervenes in these first moments of testing a
hypothesis, but also during the entire process. Methodeutic logic impels us to pursue, to
choose between possible explanations, that which is most simple, where ‘simple’ means
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for  Peirce  “more  facile  of  human  imagination”  (CP  4.644,  1908),  and  with  the  least
possible number of arbitrary conventions.
24 We can thus conclude that imagination not only has to do with abduction – the inventive
phase  of  science  –  but  also  with  the  second and third  forms of  reasoning,  i.e.  with
deduction  (the  explanatory  phase)  and  with  induction  (the  verification  phase).
Imagination, moreover, plays an important role in the handling of hypotheses, in the
development of their possible consequences and in their verification.  The warrant of
deduction is that the facts presented in the premisses could not under any imaginable
circumstances be true without involving the truth of the conclusion. That is, we cannot
imagine a state of things in which the premises are true without the conclusion also being
true  (CP 2.778,  1901).  In  the  case  of  induction,  there  are  things  that  can be  proved
inductively by imagining and analyzing instances of the surdest description (CP 5.448,
1905).
25 Peirce thus defends the role of imagination as part of the correct method of research, and
we  can  verify,  as  I  will  show  in  what  follows,  that  his  defense  and  usage  of  the
imagination appear in numerous different parts of his system of thought. I will briefly
provide some examples of the role which Peirce assigns to this faculty.
 
IV. Some Applications of the Imagination Within
Peirce’s System
Imagination and Mathematics
26 One of Peirce’s most vehement defenses of the imagination is that which he makes within
the realm of mathematics.  The imagination is central for a deductive science such as
mathematics, since ‘deductive’ does not mean for Peirce that a science is mechanical or
lacking imagination, as we will see in what follows.
27 For Peirce, mathematics is an observational science: it functions by means of a special
mode of observation, i.e. that which is directed to the creations of our mind, to imaginary
constructions  with  some  degree  of  fixity  (CP  2.305,  1901).  Mathematicians  construct
figures,  establish  hypotheses  and  draw  out  their  consequences  and  examine  their
relations, all by means of imaginary objects. In the imagination a type of diagrammatic
representation is formed, that is constructed so that there would be something closely
similar in every possible state of things to which the hypothetical description would be
applicable,  and is  constructed so  that  it  shall  have no other  characters  which could
influence  the  reasoning  (CP  4.233,  c.1902).  The  diagram  constructed  in  this  way  is
modified in  a  process  that  takes  place  in  the  mind,  since,  as  Fernando Zalamea has
written,  “the  imagination  of  mathematical  possibilities  does  not  require  marks”
(Zalamea 2011: 94). Peirce describes this diagrammatic reasoning in the following way:
We  form  in  the  imagination  some  sort  of  diagrammatic,  that  is,  iconic,
representation  of  the  facts,  as  skeletonized  as  possible.  The  impression  of  the
present writer is that with ordinary persons this is always a visual image, or mixed
visual  and  muscular;  but  this  is  an  opinion  not  founded  on  any  systematic
examination.  If  visual,  it  will  either  be  geometrical,  that  is,  such  that  familiar
spatial  relations  stand for  the  relations  asserted  in  the  premisses,  or  it  will  be
algebraical, where the relations are expressed by objects which are imagined to be
subject to certain rules, whether conventional or experiential. This diagram, which
has been constructed to represent intuitively or semi-intuitively the same relations
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which are abstractly expressed in the premisses, is then observed, and a hypothesis
suggests itself that there is a certain relation between some of its parts – or perhaps
this  hypothesis  had  already  been  suggested.  In  order  to  test  this,  various
experiments are made upon the diagram, which is changed in various ways. This is
a proceeding extremely similar to induction, from which, however, it differs widely,
in that it  does not deal with a course of experience, but with whether or not a
certain state of things can be imagined. Now, since it is part of the hypothesis that
only  a  very  limited  kind  of  condition  can  affect  the  result,  the  necessary
experimentation can be very quickly completed; and it is seen that the conclusion is
compelled to be true by the conditions of the construction of the diagram. This is
called “diagrammatic, or schematic, reasoning. (CP 2.778, 1901)
28 The imagination thus plays a central role in this type of reasoning, which Peirce calls
‘diagrammatic’ or ‘schematic,’ and which has nothing to do with the course of experience,
but rather with whether a certain state of things can be imagined or not. Daniel Campos
has described the skills necessary for the mathematician: power of imagination to create
hypothetical  presentations,  power  of  concentration  to  discriminate  between
mathematically essential and superfluous relations, and power of generalize on the basis
of the characters and relations represented (Campos 2009: 137). Mathematics requires
perfect imaginability as well as an extreme familiarity with spatial relations (CP 4.246,
c.1902). On another occasion Peirce wrote that “mathematics calls for the profoundest
invention, the most athletic imagination, and for a power of generalization” (CP 4.611,
1908).
29 Mathematics is purely deductive, and obtains necessary conclusions apodictically. This is
necessary  reasoning,  i.e.  applicable  to  all  possible  cases.  Nevertheless,  its  manner  of
reasoning  and  its  experiments  are  based  on  the  imaginative  study  of  an  individual
schema,  or  of  various individual  schemas which represent  alternative possibilities.  It
might appear that when one constructs a figure in the imagination instead of on paper,
any desired line might be added, but this is not the case. The image, as Peirce affirms, has
a certain power of persisting such as it is and resisting metamorphosis. Thus, any fiction
has certain characteristics which someone has attributed to it and which cannot be freely
altered. Inner objects do offer a certain degree of resistance, though not in a fashion
comparable to that of facts existing in reality (CP 5.45, 1903).
30 The necessary character  of  mathematics,  thanks  to  the presence of  the imagination,
combines without contradiction with surprising discoveries, just as occur in any other
observational science.  The hypotheses of the mathematician are creatures of his own
imagination, and at times surprising things are discovered. We thus learn that surprises
are not linked only to the real world (CP 5.567, 1901) nor is the inventive power linked
exclusively to abductions regarding that which exists. Experiments on diagrams, which
question the nature of the relations involved, may provoke unintended and unexpected
changes. All deductive reasoning involves an element of observation and discovery in the
imagination.
31 It can thus be concluded with Peirce that the imagination is central to mathematical
reasoning, necessary for invention and, in part, responsible of the superior certainty of
the mathematician’s results, because the mathematician’s experiments, being conducted
in the imagination upon objects  of  his  own creation,  cost  next  to  nothing,  and also
because due to his reasoning only concerning hypothetical conditions the assurance of
the mathematician is greater, not being open to unknown conditions which may alter the
results (CP 5.8, c.1907).
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32 Phenomenology  is  another  case,  within  Peirce’s  system,  of  a  science  which  has  its
foundations in the imagination. The capacity for imagination is necessary in order to
separate and study that which appears before us.  Peirce distinguishes three types of
separation. First,  there are ideas which are little allied amongst themselves,  with the
result that consciousness of one of these ideas does not imply consciousness of the other.
Hence,  we  can  imagine  red  without  imagining  blue,  and  vice  versa.  This  type  of
separation is  termed a  dissociation.  Secondly,  prescision occurs  when,  even in  cases
where two conceptions cannot be separated in the imagination,  we can suppose one
without the other, that is we can imagine data from which we should be led to believe in a
state of things where one was separated from the other. Thus, we can suppose uncolored
space, though we cannot dissociate space from color. In other words, prescision consists
in  imagining  ourselves  in  situations  in  which  certain  elements  of  fact  cannot  be
ascertained. For example, Peirce states that prescind the geometrical figure from color
consists in imagining it to be so illuminated that its hue cannot be made out (CP 2.428,
1893).  This  is  a  different  and more  complicated  operation than merely  attending  to
certain  elements  and  forgetting  the  rest,  and  cannot  be  carried  out  without  the
imagination. Thirdly, even when one element cannot even be supposed without another,
they may ofttimes be distinguished from one another. Thus we can neither imagine nor
suppose a taller without a shorter, yet we can distinguish the taller from the shorter.
Peirce terms this manner of separation ‘distinction’ (CP 1.353, c.1880).
33 Peirce’s categories, deduced from the phenomena and present in them all, are closely
related  to  the  imagination.  How  could  we  separate  them  without  imagination?
Furthermore, the categories constitute precisely that which cannot be dissociated in the
imagination,  although they can be prescinded.  One category cannot be dissociated in
imagination from the others. Peirce explains this feature as follows:
Now, the categories cannot be dissociated in imagination from each other, nor from
other ideas. The category of first can be prescinded from second and third, and
second can be prescinded from third. But second cannot be prescinded from first,
nor third from second. The categories may, I believe, be prescinded from any other
one conception, but they cannot be prescinded from some one and indeed many
elements. You cannot suppose a first unless that first be something definite and
more or less definitely supposed. Finally, though it is easy to distinguish the three
categories  from one another,  it  is  extremely  difficult  accurately  and sharply  to
distinguish each from other conceptions so as to hold it in its purity and yet in its
full meaning. (CP 1.353)
34 The  imagination  is  necessary  in  order  to  separate  concepts  and  comprehend  the
categories:  in order to imagine red without blue,  or sound without a melody,  and to
realize that we cannot conceive of melody without sound (CP 1.353). We must imagine the
primary qualities, which we cannot know in any other way. We can imagine a universe
that  consists  of  a  single  quality  that  never  changes  (CP  1.322,  1903).  We  need  the
imagination in order to achieve, for instance, a general impression of pain – or of any
other quality – by imagining at the same time distinct types of pain without attending to
their parts, or imagining a color at the same time that all the rest of our consciousness is
utterly wiped out; we need the imagination in order to capture the monadic aspect of
phenomena (CP 1.424, 1893). We must also be imaginative in order to comprehend the
second category, i.e. binarity. It is necessary to imagine two objects which are not merely
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thought  as  two,  but  of  which something is  true  such that  neither  could be  removed
without destroying the fact  supposed true of  the other (CP 2.84,  c.1902).  In order to
comprehend  the  third,  on  the  other  hand,  we  must  imagine  laws  which  have  no
occurrences: this is something which we can only imagine (CP 1.304, c.1904).
 
Imagination and Semiotics
35 The imagination occurs frequently in the semiotic explanations given by Peirce. The word
‘sign,’ he affirms, is used to denote an object perceptible, or only imaginable, or even
unimaginable in a certain sense (CP 2.230, c.1902). To attach any general significance to a
sign and to know that we do attach a general significance to it, we must have a direct
imagination of something not in all respects determinate (CP 5.371, 1877). His principal
classification of signs can be explained with the help of the imagination: the value of an
icon consists in its exhibiting the features of a state of things regarded as if it were purely
imaginary (CP 4.448,  c.1903).  An index,  on the other hand,  assures a  positive fact.  A
symbol implies existent instances of what the symbol denotes, although they exist in the
possibly imaginary universe to which the symbol refers (CP 2.249, 1903). A symbol implies
that we are able to imagine certain things, for instance birds, and associate the word with
them (CP 2.298, 1893). Symbol, with the aid of imagination, serves to make thought and
conduct ra- tional and enables us to predict the future.
36 In addition, from Peirce’s point of view, the interpretant (that other sign which the first
sign gives rise to in the mind of the interpreter) requires the imagination. What Peirce
calls an immediate interpretant is a schema in imagination, the vague image or what there
is in common to the different images of the same thing (CP 8.314). In speaking of the
logical interpretant, Peirce affirms that first logical interpretants stimulate us to various
voluntary performances in the inner world. We imagine ourselves in various situations
and animated by various motives; and we proceed to trace out the alternative lines of
conduct which the conjectures would leave open to us (CP 5.481, c.1907).
 
Imagination and Logic
37 In the field of logic, according to Peirce, the imagination takes far wider flights, being
bounded solely by the limits of its own powers (CP 5.440, 1905). One of these imaginary
flights  led  Peirce,  for  example,  to  think  of  existential  graphs,  which  have  an
extraordinary plasticity: “the success of existential graphs, which provide a unique set of
uniform axioms for the classical calculus of propositions, the classic calculus of first order
relations and some modal calculi,  have their basis in the plasticity of certain rules of
transformation situated on a continuum” (Zalamea 2010: 5). The graphs are related to
imaginary worlds.  When we work with them we employ, or at least imagine that we
employ, different things, e.g. a sheet of paper of different tints on its two sides (CP 4.573,
1906). The first convention for these graphs is that there is an assertion sheet which is
considered as expressing an assertion made by an imaginary person called a ‘graphist.’
38 On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that logic, for Peirce, is much more than a
mere discipline. Rather, it is a long and difficult art which he understood as a way of
entering into human thought (CP 5.359, 1877). Peirce dared to sketch out the path by
which knowledge is produced. For him, it was clear that the explanation of the process of
arriving at discoveries could not be merely psychological, given that all the psychology in
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the world would leave the logical problem just as it was (CP 5.172, 1903). This process of
discovery is structured and susceptible to a logical explanation: “there is a purely logical
doctrine  of  how discovery  must  take  place,  which,  however  great  or  little  is  its
importance, it is my plain task and duty here to explore” (CP 2.107, c.1902). Creativity
acquires a logical form via abduction, thus putting imagination in the center, not only of
logic, but of all human knowledge.
 
Imagination and Ethics
39 For Peirce, ethics is not limited to telling people what they must or must not do (MS 675,
1911; EP 2: 459; CP 2.198, c.1902); indeed it goes beyond a mere dichotomy. Peirce an
ethics has to do with admirable conduct. “The righteous man is the man who controls his
passions, and makes them conform to such ends as he is prepared deliberately to adopt as
ultimate” (CP 5.130, 1903). Ethics, from the Peircean pragmatist point of view, is seen as
our guiding ourselves in accordance with our reason, which can grow and invent the
modes by which it will grow, and which has the capacity to go beyond what is given,
acting  in  an  interconnected  fashion  with  the  imagination  and  the  rest  of  human
capacities. Ethics consists in our embodying ideals in our lives, bringing us closer to our
ends. Indeed, the imagination fulfills a fundamental function with regards to those ideals
which must orient our conduct: man imagines what the consequences of fully carrying
out his ideals would be, and asks himself what the esthetic quality of those consequences
would be (CP 1.591, 1903). On this basis, they make resolutions and determinations which
will guide their actions.
 
V. The Connection of Reason and Imagination
40 Before concluding, I will explain this relation between imagination and reason a little
more in depth. I have upheld this relation throughout this entire article, and I will show
now that the most important nexus between imagination and reason are the habits.
41 Imagination is necessary so that reason can function; it aids reason on the road to truth
and in its interconnection with life, as a guide of action. Indeed, as Peirce states on one
occasion,  thought  is  the  development  of  a  belief-habit  which takes  place  in  the
imagination (CP 3.160, 1880). Intelligence does not consist in feeling a certain way, but in
acting in a certain way, taking into account that many times these actions are internal
and occur in the imagination (CP 6.286, 1893). For Peirce, the formation of habits is one of
the most essential ingredients of moral and logical self-control, and all self-control that is
a result of training takes place in the imagination (CP 5.533, c.1905).
42 The fact that the imagination contributes to forming habits,  states Peirce on another
occasion, is precisely that which separates it from mere fantasy: “Day-dreams are often
spoken of as mere idleness; and so they would be, but for the remarkable fact that they go
to form habits, by virtue of which when a similar real conjuncture arises we really behave
in the manner we had dreamed of doing” (CP 6.286, 1893). How does the imagination
carry out this formation of habits which will determine our actions and our reasoning?
Merely  imagining  oneself  reacting  in  a  specific  way  can  cause,  after  numerous
repetitions,  the  class  of  reaction  that  is  imagined.  We  imagine  cases,  place  mental
diagrams before our mind’s eye, and multiply these cases, until a habit is formed (CP
2.170, c.1902). We may imagine the occurrence of the stimulus, and think out what the
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results of different actions will be. One of these will appear particularly satisfactory; and
then that mode of reaction “receives a deliberate stamp of approval” (CP 5.538, c.1902).
That stamp implies the act of recognition as one’s own, being placed by a deed of the soul
upon an imaginary anticipation of experience. In some way, one knows what to expect
from then on, what will happen, and when a similar occasion arises one will see that the
habit has already been established. Peirce gives the following example:
I well remember when I was a boy, and my brother Herbert was scarce more than a
child, one day, as the whole family where at table, some spirit from a “blazer,” or
“chafing-dish,” dropped on the muslin dress of one of the ladies and was kindled;
and how instantaneously he jumped up, and did the right thing, and how skillfully
each motion was adapted to the purpose. I asked him afterward about it, and he
told me that since Mrs. Longfellow’s death he had often run over in imagination all
the  details  of  what  ought  to  be  done  in  such  an  emergency.  It  was  a  striking
example of a real habit produced by exercises in the imagination. (EP 2: 413, 1907)
43 There are imaginary lines of conduct that shall give a general shape to our actual future
conduct, and is what Peirce terms a resolve (CP 5.538). Habits are acquired in this way, not
by muscular effort but rather by the internal acts of the imagination. Behaviour, affirms
Peirce,  is  always  partially  controlled  by  the  deliberate  exercise  of  imagination  and
reflexion (CP 7.381, c.1902). Hence, as Andacht has indicated, preparation is everything,
since speculating on an imaginary action may have the effect of helping us to effectively
carry out that action at some still undetermined time in the future (Andacht 1996: 1268).
44 The imagination thus serves as a preparatory meditation for action. It allows us to know
what must be and not merely what is in the actual world (CP 2.227, c.1897), and aids us in
acting in consequence. It allows us to make a unitary consideration of all that must be
done and when it should be done. The imagination thus produces real effects, not only
mere fantasies.
45 In addition to the habits there are other mechanisms, which we can briefly indicate,
involved  in  this  interconnection  of  imagination  with  reason.  The  imagination  is
necessary, in the first place, for the surprise and doubt that put reasoning into motion.
When something surprises us it is because the mind is filled up with an imaginary object
that we anticipate, and which in the end does not occur. Doubt, for its part, is a state of
hesitancy concerning an imagined state of things. A man in doubt is usually trying to
imagine  how  he  shall  act  when  he  finds  himself  in  the  imagined  situation.  In  his
imagination, he does not know which path to follow amongst those which are presented
to him (CP 5.510, c.1905).
46 Imagination is equally necessary in order to escape from doubt and advance towards
belief.  The critical common sensist,  writes Peirce, for example, must set himself to the
systematic  business  of  endeavoring  to  bring  all  his  very  general  first  premisses  to
recognition,  and of developing every suspicion of doubt of their truth,  by the use of
logical analysis, and by experimenting in imagination (CP 5.517, c.1905). Every answer to
a question that has any meaning, states Peirce, is a decision as to how we would act under
imagined circumstances (CP 5.373, 1877). To answer questions, man makes abstractive
observations, makes in his imagination a sort of skeleton diagram, or outline sketch, and
considers what modifications would require to be made. There are questions, and not
only in mathematics,  which can be resolved via imaginary experimentation,  cases in
which a generalization is needed, and when at last we arrive at a belief, that belief, which
will determine our action, is active in the imagination. A belief is an intelligent habit
upon which we shall act when occasion presents itself, and we virtually resolve to act as if
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certain  imagined  circumstances  were  perceived  (CP  2.435,  c.1893).  The  substance  of
beliefs can therefore be represented in the schemata of imagination, that is to say, in
continuous series  of  images,  these  composites  being  accompanied  by  conditional
resolutions as to conduct. (CP 5.517, c.1905).
47 Finally, the imagination is necessary in order to produce expectations. Peirce holds that
an expectation is a kind of image in the imagination characterized by vague and fluid
contours, a general idea which will govern the individual when it occurs. An expectation
is a habit of imagining, an affection of consciousness which can be directly compared with
that which occurs later (CP 2.148, c.1902).
 
Conclusion
48 Truth must first be imaginable and imagined. In order to advance in knowledge one must
explore not only the limits of experience, but also those of the imagination, something
which  has  not  been  sufficiently  taken  into  account.  It  has  always  been  said  that
knowledge  for  Peirce  starts  with  experience,  but  it  is  frequently  forgotten that  this
experience can and must also be imagined. Reason and imagination need one another.
The  order  and  rigor  of  reason  and  the  flexibility  and  freedom  of  the  imagination
complement one another, contributing to more reasonable and aesthetic thoughts and
acts.
49 A great part of our reasoning occurs through hypotheses, which cannot occur without
imagination, or else through diagrams, which are applied to a better understanding of
imaginary states of things, and help to analyze reasonings and to render ideas clear. We
need  the  imagination for  certain  mental  operations,  in  order  to  acquire  habits,  to
separate,  to  doubt  and  to  believe.  Imaginary  observation,  holds  Peirce,  is  the  most
essential part of reasoning (CP 4.355, c.1903). We need the imagination in order to explore
consequences, clarify con- cepts and advance in knowledge.
50 It is therefore essential to develop the imagination, that tool which works together with
reason, or better, which orients it and even houses it. Mere imagination is useless, but the
imagination  is  not  mere:  without  it  there  is  nothing,  intellectually  speaking.  The
imagination works in harmony with the rules dictated by the reason in order to construct
knowledge, to provide explanations, to express qualities, to envisage possible worlds, to
generate habits and actions. “Imagination and reason go hand in hand, and it is only by
means of their complete conjunction that man – slowly and sinuously, along paths full of
ups  and  downs,  advances  and  retreats,  through literary,  philosophical  and  scientific
trends – partially unveils strange secrets which should have transcended him” (Zalamea
2009: 49). The cultivation of the imagination is not only essential for artistic and scientific
creativity, but also for a greater attainment of reasonableness in general. In order that
our reason be more productive, we must stimulate our imagination, since they are closely
connected, to the point that thought “develops in the imagination.”
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ABSTRACTS
Charles S.  Peirce held a view of human reason as creative.  The objective of this article is  to
explore  more  deeply  the  Peircean  conception  of  imagination,  indispensable  for  the  correct
functioning of reason. The connection of reason and imagination is necessary in order to be able
to interpret the world, to advance towards the truth and to direct our own actions. In this paper I
will  explain the principal  forms in which these faculties  interact,  and will  provide examples
taken from the Peircean corpus.
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